Aerospace & Defence current GCC market status and evidence monitor

Executive summary

Evidence

Findings

• GAMI reports that localisation of Saudi government spending on military equipment and services reached 24.89 percent at the end of 2024, against an objective above 50 percent by 2030. The figure measures a government-spending perimeter; it is not the share of components made locally, the local content of a particular contractor, the value of current tenders or the addressable revenue available to one supplier. Horizon retains the result and the target as dated policy evidence and requires programme, package and buyer evidence before a commercial probability is assigned.
• A separate GAMI statement from the third quarter of 2024 cited 296 licensed or authorised establishments, 38 percent local content among companies operating in the military-industries sector, SAR 13 billion of local purchase orders, more than 53 industrial-participation programmes and a programme value near SAR 35 billion. These numbers use different units and may have different reporting perimeters. They must not be combined with the 24.89 percent spending-localisation result as though all figures describe the same date, denominator or current procurement pipeline.
• GAMI's Industrial Participation Policy makes the main contractor's programme obligation part of the procurement architecture. The industrial-participation agreement is concluded between GAMI and the main contractor before the related military procurement contract, while the policy priorities include national capability, a sustainable supplier base, investment, technology transfer and research and development. The agreement therefore creates a governed delivery obligation. It does not mean every localisation proposal is approved or that the aggregate programme value is open to unsolicited suppliers.
• Saudi military manufacturing, military services and trade in military articles are separately licensed activities. A GAMI licence establishes the regulated activity perimeter for the licensee; it does not provide export authorisation from the supplier's home state, security clearance, programme access, approved-vendor status, technical-data rights or acceptance of a platform-specific component. Those gates should remain separate in the opportunity record and the customer contract.
• Saudi civil maintenance follows GACAR Part 145 rather than the military-industries licensing route. The repair station must hold the appropriate approval and ratings and maintain the facilities, equipment, materials, technical data, competent personnel, inspection, quality, training, record and operating systems required for its scope. A free-zone office, local distributor or GAMI relationship cannot be used as evidence of civil repair-station approval, and a Part 145 approval cannot be extended to an unlisted location, rating or capability by commercial agreement.
• The UAE GCAA airworthiness function certifies and surveils maintenance, continuing-airworthiness, design, manufacturing and production organisations within its regulatory perimeter. The commercial test is therefore not simply whether a UAE aviation customer is interested. It is whether the proposed legal organisation, location, approval basis, scope, accountable manager, nominated personnel, facilities, exposition, quality or safety system and controlled technical data fit the activity that will actually be performed.
• Qatar QCAA publishes Part-145 and continuing-airworthiness regulatory material and provides official movement, passenger and cargo datasets. Those operating statistics can establish the scale and direction of the aviation system, but passenger totals or aircraft movements do not establish MRO demand for a named capability. The supplier still needs the operator or approved maintenance organisation, fleet and tail scope, maintenance programme, work package, approval and rating, technical authority, budget and procurement route.
• Saudi GACA reported more than 128 million passengers, more than 905,000 flights and more than 1.2 million tonnes of air cargo for 2024. These are civil-network operating totals, not a supplier pipeline. They can support a hypothesis about fleet utilisation, airport systems, cargo handling or maintenance pressure only after the relevant operator, airport, fleet, service level, current capacity, approved organisation, buyer and procurement route are identified.
• Export compliance precedes the exchange of controlled drawings, software, performance data or technical assistance. The decision file must classify the item, software, technology and service under the exporter's regime, screen destination, end user, intermediary, beneficial owner and end use, and identify licensing, re-export, brokering, sanctions, security and data-transfer conditions. A local partner's assurance that a transaction is permitted is not sufficient evidence for the exporter.
• Export-control rules follow the exporter, item and transaction, not a single GCC-wide template. UK official guidance covers controlled military goods, software and technology, dual-use items, trade controls, brokering and electronic transfer. US BIS rules also address export, re-export, in-country transfer, item classification and end-use or end-user restrictions. Horizon therefore records the governing jurisdiction and counsel or compliance owner for each pursuit instead of presenting either regime as universal legal advice.
• Aerospace qualification is usually platform, operator, work-package, part-number, process, site or source specific. A supplier may possess a recognised quality certification while remaining unapproved for the customer, platform or special process. The opportunity should name the configuration owner, design authority, approval or delegation holder, qualification plan, first-article or test evidence, non-conformance route, change control, counterfeit-parts prevention and traceability chain before schedule or revenue is forecast.
• Lifecycle support can be more demanding than the initial delivery. The commercial model must include repair and turnaround obligations, approved spares, tooling and test equipment, trained personnel, field support, warranty, reliability reporting, software and cybersecurity updates, technical publications, configuration control, obsolescence, incident or occurrence response, insurance, inventory finance and payment timing. An attractive unit price can become loss-making if long qualification and support liabilities are not funded.
• Oman CAR-145 requires approval for organisations maintaining complex motor-powered aircraft, commercial-air-transport aircraft and related components within the regulation’s scope. The CAA separately publishes AWR 030 as the application for CAR-145 or CAR-M Subpart F approval. Submitting the form, incorporating an entity or employing licensed engineers does not confer organisation privileges before approval of the legal entity, site, exposition, capability and ratings.
• Kuwait DGCA’s live safety-regulation register lists KCASR 8 Part 145 Issue 4 dated November 2025 and its airworthiness register provides a specific form for initial grant, renewal or change of an approved maintenance organisation. The edition, approval certificate and amended scope should therefore be checked directly rather than inferred from an older downloaded manual or a customer statement.
• Bahrain Civil Aviation Affairs describes a central workflow covering airworthiness documentation, operational certifications and inspections. That confirms the competent authority and process architecture, not the approval status of a named MRO, training provider, component source or airport contractor. The supplier record still needs the authority receipt, approved legal entity and exact activity scope.
• Oman CAA’s 2025 regulatory statistics show an active oversight and capability system: 109 aircraft-maintenance organisations, 95 audits, seven new maintenance organisations, 70 maintenance-engineer licences, 26 Boeing and Airbus flight simulators and 114 licences for drone activities. The counts use different regulatory units and cannot be added into a market-size measure. They support a capability and supervision map only after each organisation, person, simulator or drone activity is linked to its current certificate, approved scope, location and operating status.
• Fleet availability, airworthiness, maintenance capacity and turnaround requirements measured at platform and work-package level
• Platform-qualified local capability, component supply and industrial participation tied to a named prime or operator route
• Decision-chain evidence: Export, sanctions, security and national licensing authorities. Record the named institution, accountable role, current need and dated route into the decision.
• Decision-chain evidence: Government customer, operator, airline, lessor or prime controlling need and funding. Record the named institution, accountable role, current need and dated route into the decision.
• Evidence gate: Documented export, sanctions, security, end-user, end-use and technology-transfer clearance.
• Evidence gate: Authority and customer-recognised organisation approval, aerospace quality system and scope of work.

Method and limits

How this brief was produced

Horizon integrated official sector authorities, multilateral or research sources and the reviewed GCC sector dossier. The brief tracks market structure, commercial signals and evidence gates without inventing a regional market-size number.

Original sources